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"COMMONS gathers dust on the shelves. The future, I venture to predict, will reverse this 
order" 
BOULDING, K.E. 1957. vol. XLVII  
"The American Economic Review" page 8. 
 
SUMMARY : In the analysis of market economies by Commons, the economist, transactions 
replaced exchanges or deliveries.What was really a premonition  is the description of the 
process of valuation : in these transactions, emerging values are permanently negotiated.  
Arbitration is guaranted by an inter-individual process of deliberation but this process is 
regulated by an external power : the existence of rules. These rules are "compacted past rites" 
fashioned by some form of public collective intermediation. The minor form of intermediation 
2 
is a mere incitation to collective coordination. This coordination can be put into practice by 
means of a minimum of powerful and hierarchical links. This is this theory of negotiated value 
in a transactional vision with a true premonition  offered by Commons of the powerful 
insights present in  game theory .
3 
The Economic Evolution can't be represented by the Schumpeterian's circuit, nor by the 
simple reproduction of MARX, nor by a repeated walrasian equilibrium in economies of 
exchange (or production). The dynamics of the real world has to be conceived as the non-
intentional result of activities and projects of human mind. Human action, particularly the 
action of those who are engaged in "keeping the machines running" (in a Clarence AYRES's 
sense), is creation, invention and this process, far to be merely destructive, guarantees the 
dynamism of economies i.e. the "technological continuum" and the associated institutional 
change. Non-intentional doesn't signified that the economic evolution cannot be maitrised or 
controlled. In fact, there is no reality for central and direct control or a priori prevision of the 
evolutionary processes of economies. As AYRES said it, we can only "expressed a vague 
hope that planning would be a spontaneaous outcome of the desire of the entire community to 
correct the defects of capitalism" (1), i. e. we can only kept a vague faith in the efficiency of 
our programs of action, particularly when these programs are innovative ones. In an american 
pragmatic and institutionalist vision, that of John DEWEY, Thornsten VEBLEN, or Clarence 
AYRES, as a matter of fact, an activist behaviour insure that the dynamic is going on. (2) To 
be sure, the individual generally belonging to numerous active organizations, obeys or 
eventually deroges to existing institutional or hierarchical  patterns, but with change of 
personal habits, variation of group's routines, institutional and technological change, there is a 
possibility of evolution. The life chain begins with knowledge and go on with action and so 
on ; obviously, the crucial nexus in this chain is the evaluation of the best means for ends and, 
before that, the statement of the ends. The latter depend on values systems. 
                                                          
1 AYRES, C. E. (1943). "The significance of Economic planning" in Development of Collective Enterprise; Dynamics of an 
Emergent Economy". Ed. S. Eldridge and ali. University of Kansas Press. Quoted by WALKER, D.A. in "The Economic 
Policy Proposals of Clarence AYRES". In "MITCHELL, COMMONS, AYRES". Edited by Mark BLAUG. (1992). 
Edward Elgar. 
2 See DEWEY, J. (1972). "The development of American pragmatism", pages 23-40 in THAYER Edr. "Pragmatism : the 
classical Writings". New American library. See also for a survey of old and new pragmatism, JOAS, H. (1993). 
"Pragmatism and Social Theory". The University of Chicago Press. 
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Economists had for a long time expressed a great curiosity in value theory. References are 
well-known. In an institutionalist criticism, Thornsten VEBLEN made a prosecution of 
numerous orthodox economic theory of value. But, in our opinion,  a most constructive 
opinion in an economic value theory had been expressed by John Rogers COMMONS, the 
"conservative reformer" (3). In his analysis of market economies, transaction replaced 
exchanges or deliveries.What was really a premonition  is the description of the process of 
valuation : in these transactions, emerging values are permanently negotiated. (I) Arbitration is 
guaranted by an inter-individual process of deliberation but this process is regulated by an 
external power : the existence of rules. These rules are "compacted past rites" fashioned by 
some form of public collective intermediation.(II) The minor form of intermediation is a mere 
incitation to collective coordination. This coordination can be put into practice by means of a 
minimum of powerful and hierarchical links. This is this theory of negotiated value in a 
transactional vision with a true premonition of the powerful insights offered by game theory 
(III). John Roger COMMONS has been the great spreader of all that  in it's life, works and 
publications. 
I VALUES AND THE PROCESS OF VALUATION IN COMMON'S WORKS 
 
Valuation by playing the specific and repeated game of a transaction is a central piece of 
COMMONS's work. 
Remind that, in his vision, transaction is more complex than a pure exchange of material 
things. It's a negotiation between two owners of rights : with the possiblity in U.S. of the 
intervention of Courts of Law or of the Supreme courts. The negotiation don't bring on 
material things but on rights of property. So, final decision emanes from justice : it's an 
                                                          
3 Expression employed by KENNEDY, W. F. (1961), J. R. COMMONS, conservative reformer". Western Economic Journal. 
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institutional decision of valuation and the resulting "reasonable value" is a value resulting 
from "fair competition", a mid-term between monopolistic value and a too low value resulting 
from destructive and cut throat competition. Separation of right of property and material thing 
creates the possibility of a departure between buying and delivery (i e. taking possession of) 
ie. the possibility of credit and debt. In COMMONS's terms, "the institutional school starts 
with transactions which transfer ownership and thereby create debts" (4) "Transactions are the 
activity which transfer legal ownership at a point of time... The Court have developed a set of 
assumptions or working rules, derived from a long line of precedents from which they read 
intentions into the minds of participants in the transaction". (5) COMMONS said that the 
Court practised a "negociational or transactional psychology". 
This transaction approach of valuation applies for bargaining transactions on markets of goods 
and services, but also for "managerial transactions" (those who intervenize between a superior 
and an inferior, or between two actors hierarchicly dependant) and for "rationing transactions" 
(those managerial transactions where "the superior is a legislature, or a board of directors, or 
even a dictator backed by collective authority, which apportions, without their individual 
consent, the wealth or jobs of the nation or concern among inferiors, the only behaviouristic 
psychology permitted in rationing transactions (being) the arguments and pleadings of 
inferiors" (5). So there are three games to play in transaction to elaborate an outcome of 
valuation : a game between equals and two asymetric games involving and unequal repartition 
of power or information". In bargaining transactions, the game is between equals. A referee 
represent a third person bringing the working rules inherited from the past (it's the history 
which print the traces) ; these rules concern rights (and not things or relations between things) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
n°1, p 29-42. 
4 COMMONS, J. R. (1933) "Materialistic, psychological, institutional economics". In Economic essays in honour of Gustav 
CASSEL. Allen and un win 
5 COMMONS, J.R. id. p 97. 
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and this rules may themselves be called in question by an appeal to the supreme court. 
Referees and rules decide what is a reasonable value. In managerial or rationing transactions, 
referees and rules concern "reasonable and reasonable commands, willing and unwilling 
obedience". 
Consequently, as said COMMONS :  "Every choice, on analysis turns out to be a three 
dimensional act, which... is at one and the same time, a performance, and avoidance, and a 
forbearance (abstention). Performance is the exercise of power over nature or others, 
avoidance is its exercice in one direction rather than the next available direction ; while 
forbearance is the exercice... of a limited degree of one's possible moral, physical or economic 
power. Thus forbearance is the limit placed on performance, performance is the actual 
performance, and avoidance is the alternative performance rejected or avoided" (6). In this 
analysis, a behavioristic psychology is postulated. "In popular language, it resolves into the 
persuasions or  coercicions of bargaining transactions, the commands and obedience of 
managerial transactions, or the arguments and pleadings of rationing transactions" (7). So, 
COMMONS gave us a transactional theory of economic value : the evaluation process is a 
social process. But, in the same time, it doesn't cease to be a volitional theory of value (and 
has been criticized for this reason). "Value is derived solely from the willingness of owners, 
without coercition, duress, or misrepresentation, to alienate to each others their rights of 
ownership. This is the simplified hypothesis of institutional economics"(8). In brief, 
COMMONS proposed a theory of value borrowing to an institutional-individualistic-law 
                                                          
6 COMMONS, J. R. (1931) "Institutional Economics", The American Economic Review. December, page 654. 
7 COMMONS, J. R. (1931), Idem, page 655. 
8 COMMONS, J. R. (1936), "Institutional economics" the American Economic Review. Supplement. March, page 242. 
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regulated vision of human economic affairs : reasonable values of rights over things emerged 
in a democratic context of cooperation-conflict (9).  
What we should remember is twofold : first, this theory of value was born before game theory 
and its application to modelisation of the genesis of a convention, rule or institution ;  
secondly, the exercise of a regulatory power is first and foremost the monopole of court and 
supreme Court. 
II  For commons, IN A SOCIETY DOMINATED BY BARGAINING 
TRANSACTIONS, REGULATION and some form of external power IS NECESSARY 
AND USEFUL 
Habits and customs explained, in the first place, the form of every type of transaction. But, for 
the basis for bargaining transactions, we need to focus also on institutions of private property, 
institutions of credit, institutions of corporations or groups of corporations, institutions of 
unions... For COMMONS, we cannot also forget politico-economic institutions of democracy 
and these institutions are the background of managerial transactions (principal-agent relations 
in firms) and of rationing transactions (when power disputed is in the political market and 
when we observe some forms of dictatorship, logrolling, cooperation, collective bargaining or 
judicial process). Political-economic institutions mould activities of the state who beneficies, 
in democracy, of a delegation of authority from people. This delegation is "sovereignty" but a 
weak form of severeignty : state's activities are permanently evaluated and have to be 
legitimated. Participative evaluations are, in fact, a guarantee of good outcomes of compromis 
who insure legitimation. The usefulness of this political-economic institutions is twofold : 
"first, the state controls individual activity and simultaneously liberates and expands it, and 
                                                          
9 His inspiration may partly come from his experience as a member of Industrial Relations Commission. See his 
autobiography in COMMONS, J. R. (1934), "Myself". Macmillan. See also COMMONS, J. R. 1913. "Labor and 
administration", Macmillan. 
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second, in controlling the threat of violence, the state officials necessary determine the 
distribution of income. State officials enforce rights and duties... The fundamental benefit is 
"security of expectations", freedom from the arbitrary and capricious threat of physical 
violence, or material deprivation..." (10) So, in a society dominated by bargaining transactions, 
regulation insured by rationing transactions is a necessary complement to pacify the inherent 
conflict resolting from scarcity. Regulation is necessary and useful for the dynamism of the 
whole. In a transactional world of institutionalized individualism, there is a regulation from 
the public third partie. This regulation takes the form of an asymetric game that could be 
modelized by game theory. But the question is : what type of game should we adopted if we 
want to respect COMMONS'will ? 
 
III COMMONS'WILL, GAME THEORY AND THE DYNAMIC CHOICE. 
In the COMMONS'vision, firstly, every transaction is a "symetric" game of bargaining 
transaction or an asymetric game of managerial transactions (in organizations) and of 
rationing transactions (in the public interest).The characteristic of symetry does not signifie 
that the two parties are equal. They are only equal in their rights. In these games, 
"institutionalized individuals... tend to engage in role playing" (11). The third party in the game 
is a court who reaches the outcomes of the game "experimentally, by investigation, by 
mistakes and corrections" (12). 
Secondly COMMONS adopted a vision in which actors are "pragmatic beings always looking 
to the future and therefore always motivated by purposes". (13) These purposes may be 
                                                          
10 CHASSE, J. D. (1986). "John R. COMMONS and the Democratic state". Journal of Economic Issues. Volume XX, n°3, 
september, pages 759-784. 
11 GONCE, R. A. (1971), "John R. COMMONS's legal economic theory". Journal of Economic Issues. September, pages 80 
to 95. 
12 COMMONS, J. R. (1934), "Institutional Economics". Macmillan. Pages 653-654. 
13 idem. P 655. COMMONS'choice is not the same as the VEBLEN's one. COMMONS adopted a pragmatic vision of 
JAMES or DEWEY's type. "We use the term pragmatism always in the scientific sense of Peirce as a method of 
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collective purpose of the going concern in a context where working rules create constraints on 
individual behavior but also leave the individual certain rights and liberties. 
Thirdly, outcomes of the game are "reasonable values" in every transaction even in a state of 
imperfect competition (structure). Note that rationality is of an eclectic type and not a usual 
one. "The agents act largely on habitual assumptions, or decision rules, they nonetheless 
engage in rational calculation... A factor of paramount importance is relative bargaining 
power, a variable that COMMONS refers to as the degree of reciprocity. It is a function of the 
distribution of rights, powers, and so forth, enforced by prevailing ethical beliefs, customs, 
private working rules, and laws of the state". (14) If legal rights and customs are legitimated, so 
are outcomes of the game. This doesnot forbid the possibility of an evolutive set of laws and 
rules, in formation of wages [for example see COMMONS, J. R. 1924. "Legal foundations of 
capitalism". University of Wisconsin Press. Chapter VIII, (15)] 
Modern game theory has put the accent on equilibrium of respective strategy choices when 
each playor, knowing the full rationality of the other player, can in principle, take the latter's 
choice as given for choosing so as to maximize his own expected utility. The usual problem is 
the lack of confidence. With game theory, we know that in a one-shot prisoner's dilemna i. e. 
when confidence merely does not exists, the Nash-equilibrium is inefficient (schéma 1) 
Schéma 1. The prisoner's dilemna* 
PRISONER 2 
 
  Mum Fink 
PRISONER 1 Mum (-1 ;-1) (-9 ;0) 
 Fink (0,-9) (-6,-6) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
investigation, but we consider that Peirce used it only for the physical sciences where there is no future and no purpose, 
while JAMES and DEWEY use it always for the human sciences, where the subject-matter itself is a pragmatic being 
always looking to the future and therefore always motivated by purpose". 
14 GONCE, R. A. 1971, op. cit., p 90. 
15 See also, BIDDLE, J. E. (1990),"Purpose and evolution in COMMONS 's institutionalism". History of Political Economy. 
n°1, pages 19-47.  
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* we underline the payoff to player j's best response to each of player i's feasible strategies. A 
pair of strategies satisfies condition of being a Nash Equilibrium if each player's strategy is a 
best response to the other's-that is, if both payoffs are underlined in the corresponding cell of 
the bi-matrix. Thus, (Fink, Fink) is the only strategy pair that satisfies Nash Equilibrium (16) 
Indeed, in COMMONS'vision, there were numerous ways to counterbalance this lack of 
confidence.  
The first way was to create a "commonwealth" i. e. a common cultural background by 
accumulating lessons of previous experiments and insuring their collective understanding. In 
COMMONS'view, it's a "kultur" defined by the diverse hopes of the members born into and 
socialized by a "going concern" that will probably outlive them... The harmony of interests in 
the commonwealth inspires mutual dependance and social cohesion, and it creates an 
incentive for settling the disputes arising from conflicts of interest" (17). This creation of a 
common-wealth is the outcome of "jurisprudence" of the common law courts. One outcome is 
reasonable value in an historical and collective sense : "our idea of reasonable value is the 
consensual idealism of those who work together and are dependant one upon another for the 
continuance of their cooperation. It is not what I think ought to be, but what "we think" ought 
to and can be attained as a going concern" (18). Naturally, this common-wealth is not a 
godsend. Conflicts of power exists, but, as we said before, they are pacified in democratic 
societies. We began with collective dictatorships and we finish with collective bargaining i. e. 
a game where both sides are organized equally. In the labor market, for example, "neither 
employer nor employee acts individually. But the representative of each draw a joint 
                                                          
16 GIBBONS, R. (1992), "A primer in game theory"; Simon SCHUSTER. 
17 CHASSE, J. D. (1986), "J. R. COMMONS and the Democratic State, Journal of Economic Issues. Vol. XX. n°3, 
september, pages 770-771. 
18 COMMONS, J. R. (1934), Institutional Economics. op. cit., p 743. 
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agreement, fixing hours, wages and working rules. Then each individual contract of labor 
between an individual employer and an individual worker is controlled by the joint agreement. 
This is what we meant by a Trade Agreement... Collective bargaining is the working rules of 
Trade Agreements" (19) 
The second way to counterbalance the lack of confidence corresponds to the experience of 
COMMONS as a mediator in labor conflicts, his experience beginning when he was a 
member of the National Civic Federation and developing after (Wisconsin Industrial 
Commision, Industrial Relations of United States, 1913-1916...). In COMMONS'view, State 
may be a third party to every bargaining transaction or managerial transaction and state, by 
having the monopole of the enforcement of the law, is the only great "authorizer" of the 
transfering of legal control which results of every transaction. He is a referee, or designs a 
mediator who have to decide in a specific new case, a new experiment of the game of 
transactions. To-day, game theory would represent it as a game of "final offer arbitration" (20). 
In the Farber's model (21) two parties in a managerial transaction make wage offers and then 
the free arbitrator decides what is the best level. Wage offer of the firm is wf ; i wage offer of 
the union is wu ; evidently, wf <wu ; the ideal settlement in the mind of the mediatior is x. In 
the game, this mediator will choose the offer that is closer to x. Asymetric information exists 
because the mediator knows x but the parties donot. Firm and union believe that x is randomly 
distributed. Game theory predicts that, if the pair of offers (wf * ; wu *) is to be a Nash 
equilibrium, wf * et wu * have to result from the minimization by the firm of the expected 
wage settlement imposed by the mediator and from maximization by the union of this same 
expected value. First order conditions of this two optimizatiobon conducts can lead us to the 
                                                          
19 COMMONS, J. R. (1934), "Institutional Economics". op. cit, p 758. 
20 GIBBONS, R. (1992), "A primer in game theory", page 22 
21 FARBER, (1980) 
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following conclusion : "each party faces a trade off. A more aggressive offer (i. e., a lower 
offer by the firm or a higher offer by the union) yields a better payoff if it is chosen as the 
settlement by the arbitrator but is less likely to be chosen... When there is hardly any 
uncertainty about the arbitrator's prefered settlement, neither party can afford to make an offer 
far from the mean (of the probability distribution) because the arbitrator is very likely to prefer 
settlements close to this mean" (22).Once again, we find  that in transaction, a smaller 
incertitude induce conventional conducts and reinforcement of a wage convention. As in 
COMMONS'view, the existence of a wise mediator (23) guarantes non-aggressive offers and 
the security of expectations. With a just an evolutive jurisprudence and with a custornary 
appeal to mediatorisation, transactions can be analyzed as cooperative games or tendential 
cooperative games. Remember the common view of COMMONS who does not postulates an 
usual rational behavior (but an eclectric form of rationality) ; and of game theory in which a 
Nash equilibrium for our "final offer arbitration" has not necessary any optimal solution in the 
usual sense (see, for example, the prisoner's dilemna) (24)  
Briefly, , we know that game theory to-day is a beautiful instrument for describing the 
behavior of selfishly motivated actors placed in situations of mutual interdependency. Here, 
we say that we can analyze some propositions of COMMONS by means of this game theory. 
                                                          
22 GIBBONS, R. (1992),. op. cit., p 26; 
23 An example of a wise mediator has been given by J. R. COMMONS in "Institutional Economics" : The Industrial 
Commission appointed an advisory committee which... would be the principal administrative authority, drafting all the 
rules and regulations... The members of the advisory committee, representing "capital" and "labor", would not be chosen 
by the state commission in bureaucratic or civil service examination fashion but would be chosen by the organized 
interests themselves... In fact, a new kind of civil service had been incorporated into the administration of the labor laws. It 
is a set of state officials effectively appointed by the joint action of conflicting organizations of "capital" and therefore 
having the confidence of both sides. As such, the state officials acts, not as compulsory 'arbitrators" coming from a 
superior authority, the state, but as voluntary "conciliators" whose business it is to bring, opposing interest together on a 
basis of" "facts" known to be such on both sides, and thereby aiding them in drafting the "working rules" under which, as 
individuals, they must severally operate. Since these rules can be changed at amy time, on the basis of further investigation 
and experience, it is a system of continuous conciliation, without dictratorship, of continually conflicting interests" op. cit., 
p 848-849. 
24  See, for example, BIANCHI, M. and MOULIN, H. (19  ) "Strategic interactions in Economics : the game theoretic 
alternative". In NEIL DE MARCHI and BLAUG, M. "Appraising Economic theoris. Studies in the Methodology of 
research programs". Edward Elgar. 
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We also knew that game theory still "cannot capture the whole complexity of social inter-
actions" and that "game theory produces its most influential contributions by mingling with 
models of denser empirical content" (25). Our hypothesis (to be checked and double-checked 
by greater experts of COMMONS'work than me) is that J. R. COMMONS has anticipated this 
preceeding conclusion. Sixty years before, after a life of research and experimental behavior, 
he said that negotiations are central in dynamic economies and democratic societies. He 
described our world as a world of legal, negociated or arbitrated transactions. The originality 
of COMMONS was in saying that every transaction has to be seen as a specefic experiment 
because of the evolution of laws, rules and institutionalized. History is not repeating rifle or 
repeated static game. COMMONS decided for himself that praxis is a form of discovery 
of reasonable values.We can also deduced that, contrary to the fact that numerous works tend 
to dictate mere theoretical use and abuse of game theory, empiry is not unwelcome to-day in 
game theory and that experimental economics is not irelevant. 
                                                          
25 BIANCHI, M. and MOULIN, H. (1991), op. cit., page 183. 
